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DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
INSIDERS WHO PURCHASE SHARES*
Michael Conantf
The question treated here is whether a corporate officer or director
who purchases outstanding shares in his firm has an affirmative fiduciary
duty of disclosufe f6 the selling shareholder.' The'tiend'in the common
law of a growing minority of states and under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to extend insiders' corporate fiduciary
duty to the individual shareholder from whom he purchases shares.'
Even in the absence of active fraud by misrepresentation, b the half-
truth in response t6 inquiry, or by concealment, the insider will be held
liable for failure to come forth and disclose unusual material facts which
he knows will affect the share price and which are unavailable in the
corporation's books or financial reports. A correlative common law rule
holds that the insider is usually not required to account to his corpora-
tion for profits made from using corporate inside information to speculate
in its stock.
It will be argued that both of these legal rules and the reasons offered
to support them are in error. It is submitted ,that they are based on a
misapprehension of the market relations involved and, tend to misdirect,
rather than strengthen, the fiduciary duties which are the legal founda-
tion of the corporate system of enterprise.
This study examines the factual basis of the corporate insider's fidu-
ciary duties and the arguments for extending the duty of disclosure to
the individual stockholder. The market uncertainties involved in trading
in corporate shares are examined against the background of the burden
of proving good faith by a corporate fiduciary accused of doing wrong.
* The author is indebted, for the critical suggestions that have been incorporated in this
article, to Professors Harry G. Henn of the Cornell Law School, Wilbur Katz of the Uni-
versity of Chicago and Dow Votaw of the University of California.
'I See contributors' section, masthead p. 138, for biographical data.
1 See Berle, "Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock," 25 Mich. L. Rev.
827 (1927); Laylin, "The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock," 27 Yale L.J.
731 (1918); Smith, "Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director from a Share-
holder," 19 Mich. L. Rev. 698 (1921); Walker, "The Duty of Disclosure by a Director
Purchasing Stock from his Stockholders," 32 Yale LJ. 637 (1923); Weisbrod, "Trading
in Business Ownership," 1954 U. Ill. L.F. 465; Wilgus, "Purchase of Shares of Corporation
by a Director from a Shareholder," 8 Mich. L. Rev. 267 (1910). Notes, 29 Calif. L. Rev.
67 (1940); 47 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1933); 43 Iowa L. Rev. 109 (1957); 51 Mich. L. Rev.
290 (1952); 32 Mich. L. Rev. 678 (1934); 14 Minn. L. Rev. 530 (1930); 5 Syracuse L.
Rev. 71 (1954); 11 Wis. L. Rev. 547 (1936).
2 Ballantine, Corporations 212-16 (rev. ed. 1946) ; 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law & Prac-
tice §§ 443-44 (1959); Loss, Securities Regulation 825 (1951). Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App. 134, 108 N.E.2d 493 (1952), 1953 U. Ill. L.F. 144;
Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); jacquith v. Mason,
99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916).
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A survey of the recent cases concerning insiders' purchases of shares is
made in order to establish the magnitude of the purported trend toward
increasing corporate fiduciaries' duties in this area. Finally, an argument
is made to support the theory that the fiduciary duty in this situation, as
in all of the insider's other corporate activities, is owed to the corpora-
tion, not to the selling shareholder.
It should be noted that this study does not cover the separate, but
sometimes related problems of the sale of the corporate control by a
majority insider or group.3 In such cases the questions treated here-
duties of disclosure when the insider is merely purchasing shares of his
firm-if they arise, become secondary and not the controlling law of the
case.
TH-E MAJORITY RULE
Almost all of the cases litigating the insider's duties of disclosure to
stockholders from whom he buys shares have arisen in close corpora-
tions.4 Only-.here is it physically feasible to make such disclosures, The
question usually has arisen when, because of his insidp_posioniJn the
firm,- the officer or director knows of an impending assured sale by the
corporation of its assets _a merger, or other business fact that is very
likely to. cause a sharp increase in theprice of the firm's stock. Absent
active fraud, the majority of decisions .have held that the -insider has no
fiduciary duty to ome forth and makeaffirmative disclosures of the
special facts he knows about the firm that will soon affect the price of
the stock.'
The courts adhering to the majority rule, that the insider has no af-
firmative duties of disclosure to the selling shareholder, re&96n that this
follows directly from the nature of the fiduciary duty. The rules here are
3 This problem received extensive comment in the journals following the decision of
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), 22 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 895, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1274. See Berle, "'Control' in Corporate Law," 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 1212, 1220 (1958); Hill, "The Sale of Controlling Shares," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986
(1957); Jennings, "Trading in Corporate Control," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956); Leech,
"Transactions in Corporate Control," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956).
When corporate insiders purchase outstanding shares as part of an overall scheme to
transfer corporate control, the special area of fiduciary law relating to transfer of control
receives the dominant treatment. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa.
410, 76 Ati. 77 (1910); Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 80 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1935).
4 The analogy between the close corporation and the partnership is important to this
subject. When purchasing a co-partner's interest, the purchasing partner is under a duty
to make disclosure of facts having a bearing on value which are not open to the other
partner. Crane, Law of Partnership 360 (2d ed. 1952), and cases cited. If it can be shown
that the stockholder in the close corporation places the same trust in his corporate officers
or directors when selling his shares to them as the law presumes partners place in each
other, the majority rule is clearly wrong. For a general discussion of the partnership
analogy, see Hornstein, "Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership," 18 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 435 (1953). Compare 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations 17-22 (1958).
5 Cases adopting the majority rule in twenty states are cited in Chenery Corp. v. S.E.C.,
128 F.2d 303, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1942), remanded on other grounds, 318 U.S. 80 (i943); 3
Fletcher, Private Corporations § 1168.1 (1947) ; Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
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adopted from the law of trusts. The officer or director is not a strict
trustee, since he does not take legal title to the corporate property. He
is a fiduciary (quasi-trustee) to the corporation, however, because he is
trusted by the corporation to manage its business.' He is trusted to deal
with the corporate property and business opportunities for the beneficiary
of the trust, the corporation, and its stockholders as a group. Since he is
in a position of trust, the insider has a fiduciary duty of absolute good
faith and undivided loyalty to his corporation. He must act to maximize
the corporation's profits. Other than his contractual salary, he is pre-
cluded from making personal profits at the expense of the corporation.
It follows directly from this that he is precluded from usurping the cor-
poration's business opportuniti6s. And, when the insider deals with his
own corporation, personal transactions with the corpus of his trust, he
has an affirmative duty to disclose to his beneficiary (represented by tht
board of directors) every material fact he knows about the transactiong.
Courts following the majority rule hold that there is no logical reason
to extend the insiders' corporate fiduciary duty to the individual share-
holders and require affirmative disclosures to them.7 In the law of trustA,
the fiduciary duty attaches when the trustee deals with the corpus of his
trust. The corpus here is the corporate management, its property and its
business opportunities. But the insider is not dealing with the corpus of
his trust when he purchases outstanding shares in the corporation. The
outstanding shares are not within the control of the corporate insider and
for this reason can not be considered part of the corpus of his trust.8
Furthermore, it is the corporation which has employed the insider and
placed the trust in him. Consequently, the insider has an unlimited duty
of trust to the corporation, the stockholders as a group, which binds him
and takes precedence in his private business dealings with an individual
stockholder. If, for example, the corporation is in the market to pur-
chase its own shares or the insider is directed to purchase shares as agent
for the corporation, his fiduciary duty is to the corporation to minimize
its cost, not to the selling shareholder.' Since failure to come forward and
make affirmative disclosures to the selling shareholder will in no way
6 3 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 838 (1947), and cases cited.
7 "There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connection, between holders of shares
in a bank, in their individual capacity, on the one side, and the directors of the bank on
the other. The directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such in-
dividual stockholders." Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 384 (1847).
8 Chatz v. Midco Oil Corp., 152 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1945); Hooker v. Midland Steel
Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445, 447 (1905); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla.
461, 179 P.2d 147, 156 (1947). Cf. Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 515 (1873);
Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656,23 At]. 426, 427 (1891).
) Gladstone v. Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 50 N.E.2d 958 (1943). See Note, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 769, 776 (1946). It is fundamental that a servant can serve only one master at
a time. 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 492, at 154 (1946).
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injure the corpus of his trust, the majority of courts hold that the insider
need not make them.
The majority rule courts hold also that the mere relation of officer or
director to stockholder is not sufficient to raise an implied trust analogous
to that of financial advisor and client.10 A business relation between two
parties involving a single contract is not of itself sufficient to create a
confidential relation between the parties and thereby become a basis for
imposing a constructive trust." Unless there is a past history of the
insider's giving financial advice to the stockholder now selling him shares,
there is no factual basis for a confidential relation creating a special duty
of disclosure to the selling stockholder. In fact, the reaction of a share-
holder when approached by an insider who offers to purchase his shares
will likely be one of suspicion that the insider has a scheme to make a
quick speculation, not one of trust. The majority rule courts hold that
the expectation in a reasonable shareholder, engaging in a single transac-
tion with a corporate insider, is no different here than in other ordinary
transactions of the market. 2 The shareholder should thus expect to deal
at arm's length and not expect the insider to volunteer information he
has learned by virtue of his corporate position.
The mere fact of superior knowledge on the part of the corporate in-
sider buying shares is held by the majority of courts not to create duties
of affirmative disclosure.' Unequal knowledge is a common character-
istic of contract negotiations in an enterprise economy. In a large pro-
10 Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933); Blabon v. Hay, 269
Mass. 401, 169 N.E. 268, 271 (1929); Schuur v. Berry, 285 Mich. 654, 281 N.W. 393, 395
(1938); Binns v. Copper Range Co., 335 Pa. 257, 6 A.2d 895, 898 (1939).
11 "A 'confidential relation' arises by reason of kinship between the parties, or profes-
sional, business or social relations that would reasonably lead an ordinarily prudent person
in the management of his business affairs to repose that degree of confidence in the de-
fendant which largely results in the substitution of the will of the defendant for that of
the plaintiff in the material matters involved in the transaction." Mahan v. Dunkleman,
205 Okla. 54, 58, 234, P.2d 366, 370 (1951), quoting from a headnote to Derdyn v. Low,
94 Okla. 41, 220 Pac. 945 (1923). See 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 482 (1946).
"No matter what the relationship is or may be termed, it has never been held that the
director is accountable for the proceeds of his purchase where the stockholder did not rely
on the director in making the sale." Fisher v. Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 182
N.Y.S.2d 328, 334 (1940), aff'd per curiam, 285 N.Y. 679, 34 N.E.2d 379 (1941).
1-2 Leech argues that the expectations of selling shareholders about what affirmative dis-
closures they can expect, even though they make no inquiries, depends in part on whether
the law of their state has followed the majority rule or the counter-rule. Leech, "Transac-
tions in Corporate Control," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 746 (1956). It is hard to believe
that shareholders have the grasp of law that Leech presumes them to have. It is also
unlikely that they will seek legal advice about the nature of bargaining in special situations.
13 "Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not to be made so onerous that men of
experience and ability will be deterred from accepting such office. Law in its sanctions
is not coextensive with morality. It cannot undertake to put all parties to every con-
tract on an equality as to knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness. It cannot under-
take to relieve against hard bargains made between competent parties without fraud."
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 362-63, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933). See Seitz v. Frey,
152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266, 268 (1922).
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portion of business negotiations, one party, who has great knowledge
from many years of experience dealing in a specific product or service,
deals with another person who only occasionally buys or sells the item
in question. The usual contract rule is that, absent inquiry by the other
party, the party who has superior information about the product and its
market has no duty to make affirmative disclosures.' 4 The party who has
been diligent in reducing some of the market uncertainties to fact is not
required to come forth and offer this information to the less diligent.
Thus, the purchaser of land does not have to inform the seller that he
has found out that a street will be put through the area, greatly increasing
land values.15 And the seller of an old, used truck, who is not asked, need
not volunteer the information that the truck has been in a wreck and
carefully repaired.' 6 The land speculator could be called an "insider,"
since he has inside information about the land market, and the truck
seller could likewise be called an "insider" concerning the history of
his truck. Both had inside information which made their market posi-
tions superior. The law required neither to make affirmative disclosures.
In the free market, the less informed party to the sale of a tangible
item may inspect and ask questions. If the item sold is an intangible, he
may ask questions. If he does not bother to inspect or ask questions, he
has assumed the uncertainty that the other party may bargain with su-
perior information. The corporate stockholder selling his shares to an
officer or director is in such a position. The insider is likely to have more
information about the corporation's prospects than the ordinary share-
holder. The shareholder is free to ask the insider for a summary of facts
on which he bases his purchase. In this case, the law of fraud requires a
complete answer by the insider, for speaking a half-truth under the cir-
cumstances would be equivalent to misrepresentation. If the shareholder
does not bother to ask questions, he assumes the uncertainty that the
insider may deal with superior knowledge.
The majority rule is further supported by the fact that when the in-
sider purchases the shares on an exchange, making disclosures to un-
known sellers before they sell would be extremely costly and perhaps im-
possible.' 7 The policy of brokers of listed and over-the-counter securities
14 Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377, 403 (1873). See Restatement, Contracts § 472
(1932) ; Restatement, Torts § 551 (1938); Bower, Actionable Non-Disclosure 134 (1915).
Compare Prosser, Torts § 87 (2d ed. 1955).
15 James v. Anderson, 149 Va. 113, 140 S.E. 264 (1927), 56 A.L.R. 429 (1928). See gen-
erally Goldfarb, "Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation," 8 W. Res.
L. Rev. 5, 26 (1956); Keeton, "Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure," 15 Texas L.
Rev. 1, 21 (1936).
16 Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 569, 203 P.2d 758, 762 (1949).
17 Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933).
U1SUEIAINI aSnwlk
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to guard the secrecy of their customer lists would probably result in pro-
spective sellers' brokers refusing to reveal sellers' names. A rule requiring
disclosures would effectively bar stock purchases by officers and directors
except from their corporations. This would conflict with the recognized
business policy that stock ownership by officers and directors should be
encouraged, since an ownership interest is an added incentive to man-
agerial efficiency.
One final point in support of the majority rule concerns the market
uncertainties undertaken by the insider in the transaction. The officer or
director purchases shares with the superior knowledge of a forthcoming
merger, assured sale of assets, issuance of a valuable patent to the cor-
poration or some similar event. Some months or years later, after the
venture has proven profitable to the insider, the selling shareholder learns
of this and brings suit. Under trust law rules, he asks the insider to carry
the burden of showing that he acted in good faith by making disclosures
before he bought the shares. Should the selling shareholder be allowed to
impose this burden on an officer or director and upon failure of the proof
be allowed to recover the insider's profit, even though he, the shareholder,
undertook no market uncertainties? A minority of courts say 'yes' be-
cause this is a material fact available only to the insider. But the event
about which the insider knew could have failed to materialize and the
stock price could have moved down instead of up. The difficulty here is
to determine just how certain the special event was at the time the insider
purchased the shares. It could range from a contract with a guaranteed
profit already signed by the corporation to highly uncertain business
negotiations which, if they did eventuate into contract, could, after a
year or two, result either in large profits or large losses. The less certain
the expected profit or loss and the smaller its size, the less would be the
likelihood of the insider's mentioning it, even if he was informed that he
had a special duty to disclose. The further away the special event was
from realization when the insider bought the shares, the more likely he
would be to think of it as a market uncertainty and the less likely he
would be to think of it as a material "fact" which must be disclosed.
Could an insider be required to detail every transaction his firin was
negotiating before he purchased outstanding shbares? .If he is ordered by
the board of directors not to disclose inside information or knows such
disclosure would injure the firm, a legal duty of disclosure would ef-
fectively prohibit him from buying shares a large portion of the time."8
18 Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421, 426.
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THE COUNTER-RULE
The counter-rule, imposing duties of disclosure on an officer or di-
rector purchasing outstanding shares, is characterized by the c6urts
under two different labels. These are the "minority" rule and the "special
circumstances" or "special facts" rules. The minority rule courts state
that the officer and director is a fiduciary of each individual stockholder
and must disclose every material fact he knows about the corporation's
activities to the shareholder who is about to sell shares to him. Courts
following the special-circumstances rule state that, while the officer or
director is not usually a fiduciary to the individual shareholder, he must
make affirmative disclosures to the selling shareholder of all special facts
he knows about the corporation's activities that may or will soon have a
material effect on the value of the stock and that are not available in its
books or financial reports. The cases reveal that these rules are really the
same. 9 No minority rule case has held an insider liable for merely failing
to come forth and offer to explain the meaning of books of account and
company reports. All of the cases imposing liability under either of these
rules have involved knowledge of special facts by the insider not avail-
able in the firm's books. The insider's use of, and personal profit from,
his superior knowledge of these special facts, which the shareholder coufd
not find in the company's books, has been the basis of imposing on him
a duty of disclosure.
The cases originating the counter-rule have been analyzed in detail by
Mr. Wilgus.2" His amazing but verified conclusion was that every case to
1910 which enunciated an equitable duty of disclosure on the purchasing
insider as a basis for liability also contained facts proving common law
fraud. Thus, in the leading case cited as authority for the so-called minor-
ity rule, Oliver v. Oliver,2 the failure of the president purchasing shares
at $110 to disclose an assured sale of the plant which made the shares
worth $185 was accompanied by a fraudulent company report which
omitted certain assets of the firm. Stewart v. Harris,2 the other founda-
tion case of the minority rule, involved a half-truth in response to inquiry
by the selling shareholder, which is also active fraud. The defendant
19 Cf. Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 62, 64 (1955).
20 Wilgus, op. cit. supra note 1.
21 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). Here the court also found that the fiduciary rela-
tion came from another source. The president, in taking the option on the shares, gave the
stockholders the impression he would get them the highest possible price. He was thus
found to be an agent of the stockholders for the sale of their shares.
The statement of a fiduciary duty to the individual was based on the questionable
authority of Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 616 (1874). This case involved the
foreclosure of a mortgage by corporate insiders to the detriment of the firm and other
bondholders. Stock purchase was not involved. See Note, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 290 (1952).
22 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904).
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insider stated to the plaintiff that the firm was in bad 'condition and
pointed out that a large amount of property had been charged off when
he knew the property had since become valuable. Strong v. Repide,23 the
leading case adopting the special-circumstances rule, relies primarily on
the above two cases stating the minority rule. Here the failure to disclose
an assured sale of assets was accomplished by concealment of identity by
the purchasing director in order to avert inquiry concerning the acts
underlying the value of the shares. This, too, is active fraud. It appears
that all three of these founding cases for the counter-rule could have
been grounded on common law fraud instead of using equitable doctrines
of trust and constructive fraud to support liability.
Most of the more recent cases supporting special duties of disclosure
on insiders purchasing shares have also contained facts showing the
decision could have rested on common law fraud. In Humphrey v.
Baron, 4 the purchasers made fraudulent misrepresentations about the
audited value of the stock. Buckley v. Buckley,25 was a case where the
selling shareholder indicated he was placing trust in the purchasing of-
ficer by asking questions about the value of the shares, and the insider
responded with only part of the facts. Half-truths or misrepresentations
of value on which selling shareholders reasonably relied were also the
primary bases for liability in five other cases.2 In this type of case, a
misrepresentation of opinion concerning value is fraud, for when an in-
sider does render affirmative statements concerning the value of shares
in a close corporation, it is reasonable for the ordinary shareholder to
treat such expert opinion as fact and rely on it. In Schroeder v. Carroll,27
the selling shareholder asked the purchasing officer if there was "any-
thing in sight where the stockholders will receive a benefit" and received
a negative answer even though the officer knew of the coming sale of the
entire assets. Nichol v. Sensenbrenner,8 involved the same type of con-
cealment of identity to avert inquiry as was found in Strong v. Repide. 9
In other cases declaring a fiduciary duty of affirmative disclosure op
the insider to the shareholder in purchasing shares, the decision could
23 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
24 223 Iowa 735, 273 N.W. 856, 861 (1937). Similar fraudulent misrepresentations were
present in Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454, 458 (1917), and McMynn v.
Richardson-Phenix Co., 186 Wis. 442, 201 N.W. 272, 280 (1924).
25 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955 (1925).
26 Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.
2d 412, 159 P.2d 958, 969 (1945) ; Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224, 228 (1945) ;
Dalton v. Hill, 169 Kan. 388, 219 P.2d 710 (1950); Lightner v. W. H. Hill Co., 258 Mich.
50, 242 N.W. 218 (1932).
27 192 Wis. 460, 212 N.W. 299 (1927). A similar active fraud was found in Staker v.
Reese, 82 W. Va. 764, 97 S.E. 641, 645 (1918).
28 220 Wis. 165, 263 N.W. 650 (1935). Similar concealment of identity was found in
Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980, 983 (1945).
29 Supra note 23.
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have been rested on a fiduciary duty arising from another source. In
Voellmeck v. Harding,"0 the purchasing officer bought shares from a
junior official in the firm who placed trust in his superior officer for
financial advice. In Bettendorf v. Bettendorf,1 the insider purchasing
shares was administrator of an estate and purchased his shares from his
own beneficiary, In Hotchkiss v. Fischer,32 a widow, ignorant of business
affairs, asked the> 6'puhasing-her shares the meaning of the finan-
cial statements. He refused to answer this question but did mention
certain negative aspects about the condition of the firm. The widow was
found to have placed trust in the officer and relied on these half-truths.
In Jaynes v. Jaynes,3 another widow sold her shares to her brother-in-
law, officer in the firm. Evidence showed she relied on him as her financial
adviser. In Holty v. Landauer,4 an uncle held stock in trust for his
nephew and purchased the stock from his nephew, the beneficiary of the
trust.
One must conclude that most of the opinions declaring a fiduciary duty
on an insider purchasing shares to come forth and disclose facts, even
though the seller does not bother to ask, could have been founded on
common law fraud or on a duty of trust arising from another source.
These decisions do not, however, make their statements about fiduciary
duties of disclosure on officers or directors purchasing shires obiter dicta.
They are judicial dicta at least. Since the courts adopt this rule as one
of the bases of decision, it does become precedent for later cases. Hence,
it is not surprising to find it becoming an established rule of law in a
minority of states.
A few cases holding insiders liable for non-disclosure in purchasing
shares contain no active fraud and hence do rest their decision entirely
on a fiduciary duty of the insider to come forth and disclose special facts
learned within the firm. The rule in its pure form is found in Jacquith v.
Mason" and Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co.36 The rule also appears
as the sole basis of decision in two lower appellate cases in Illinois37 The
most recent holding that corporate insiders are fiduciaries to individual
shareholders is found in Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson.38
30 166 Wash. 93, 6 P.2d 373 (1931).
31 190 Iowa 83, 179 N.W. 444 (1920).
32 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
33 98 Cal. App. 2d 447, 220 P.2d 598 (1950).
34 270 Wis. 203, 70 N.W.2d 633 (1955).
35 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916).
386 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916). Critical comments on the Jacquith and Dawson
cases appear in Walker, op. cit. supra note 1, at 642.
37 Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Il. App. 134, 108 N.E. 2d 493 (1952), 1953 U. Ill. L. F. 144.
38 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959). This first Court of Appeals opinion, based on common
law fiduciary and constructive fraud concepts, was supplemented by an opinion based on
1960]
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The Court of Appeals in this case was applying Louisiana law. The con-
trol group of six persons caused the corporation to purchase plaintiff
minority shareholder's stock and allegedly induced the sale by fraudulent
misrepresentations that they did not intend to dispose of the corporation's
assets and liquidate it. The District Court found that defendants had
committed fraud.39 The Court of Appeals held the finding of active fraud
to be erroneous because the fraudulent intenf was not proven. It held
the defendant was still liable, however, but on the ground of constructive
fraud. In doing so the court explicitly stated that the insiders had a
fiduciary duty to the individual minority stockholder to supply him with
all information relating to pending negotiations to sell the assets of the
firm.
Since almost all of the recorded decisions finding wrongful acts by cor-
porate insiders when purchasing outstanding shares have involved active
fraud, why have so many courts resorted to equitable doctrines of fidu-
ciary duty to find liability? One writer suggests that subsequent to the
fusion of law and equity some courts confused common law and equitable
causes of action and thereby made unnecessary, unwarranted and il-
logical extensions of the fiduciary doctrine.4" The two reasons for this
confusion both seem to this writer to stem from the courts' efforts to give
greater protection in this situation to the victims of common law fraud
than found in the traditional remedies.
The first effect of invoking the equitable remedy was to shift the
burden of proof to the insider purchasing the shares to prove he had
acted in good faith and had made full disclosures. Thus, the seller-plain-
tiff with inadequate evidence did not have to carry the usual burden of
proving the fraud which he alleged had occurred. Feeling pity for his
unequal knowledge, the courts allowed the seller to assert the incom-
plete disclosures by the insider and make the insider carry the key
burden of persuasion.
The second reason for extending the equitable fiduciary concept into
this type of transaction probably arises from a misunderstanding of the
correct measure of damages. The usual common-law fraud damages
would be the difference between contract price and market value on date
of sale. This limited measure might in some cases allow a fraudulent
party to keep part of the fruits of his fraud. This would be true if the
market value of the stock on date of purchase, had there been no fraud,
civil law. Since constructive fraud is unknown in Louisiana civil law, the court modified
its opinion to hold that there was the necessary intent to constitute actionable fraud,
as fraud is broadly defined in the Louisiana Code. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
39 Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958).
40 Walker, op cit. supra note 1, at 639.
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was less than the resale price received by the fraudulent purchaser. For
this reason, some of the courts may have converted this from a common
law cause of action into an equitable action of constructive trust so that
plaintiff could be awarded the equitable damages of all profits made from
the fraud by the defendant. This reasoning, that there must be violation
of an equitable duty to get equitable relief, was erroneous and unneces-
sary. The measure of damages for restitution to-oa victim of common law
fraud in a case of this type would always be the entire profits made by
the fraudulent party.4' The law of restitution, especially when the cause
of action is consciously tortious conduct, will operate to prevent unjust
enrichment. In this case the damages would be the entire fruits of the
fraud received by the defendant, his profit from buying and reselling the
shares. Such result can and should be reached without resort to any
theory of trust or constructive trust.
FiDuc Y DUTY IS OWED TO CORPORATION
The prime complaint of the courts which reject the majority rule is
that when officers or directors use corporate inside information to specu-
late in the stock of their corporation, they are using a corporate asset for
their personal profit when such profit legally belongs to all the share-
holders.42 From this basic premise, the minority courts argue that the
fiduciary duty of the corporate insider should bar a private gain to him
by advance use of corporate inside information. But neither of these
premises provide a logical basis for deciding to whom the fiduciary duty
is owed. The mere existence of fiduciary responsibility in the corporate
insider does not determine that the law should extend special treatment
to stockholders who sell their shares between the time the corporate op-
portunity arises and the time it affects the stock price due to public an-
nouncement by the corporation that it has been offered or has entered
into the transaction. On the contrary, basic trust law would put no special
rights of recovery in the selling shareholder just because his purchaser
41 Staker v. Reese, 82 W. Va., 764, 97 S.E. 641, 645-46 (1919); Barnes v. Eastern &
Western Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553, 287 P.2d 929, 947 (1955). See Restatement, Restitu-
tion, §§ 151 & 154 (1937).
42 The so-called majority rule is predicated on the theory that the corporation-the
collective stockholders-is a separate and distinct legal entity, an artificial personality,
to whom the director owes his duty. The legal writers above referred to and the more
recent cases adopting the minority view, have pointed out the fallacy of this reason-
ing. These authorities logically point out that the detailed information a director has
of corporate affairs is in a very real sense property of the corporation, and that no
director should be permitted to use such information for his own benefit at the expense
of his stockholders. The so-called majority rule permits a director to secure for him-
self profits rightfully belonging to all. Such a rule offends the moral sense, and is con-
trary to our modern concept of the duty of a director towards those he represents.
Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App.2d 371, 381, 159 P.2d 980, 984-85 (1945). See Wilgus, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 297; Ballantine, Corporations 213 (rev. ed. 1946).
1960]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
was a director or officer of the corporation instead of another stranger.
Rather, trust law should hold that since the insider used a corporate
asset, corporate inside information, for his own private gain, he has ipso
facto violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation. 43 Yet in this situation
the courts have held otherwise. A growing minority has created a fidu-
ciary duty of disclosure to the selling shareholder but none rules that
a fiduciary duty to account for such profits is owed to the corporation.
The courts have held that directors or officers not in dominant control
of a solvent corporation may buy and sell stock in their corporation at
will, and that such speculation is not within the usual scope of their
fiduciary duties to the corporation. 4 This rule is based on a theory that
a corporation as such has no interest in its outstanding shares. As pointed
out in the first section of this article, the outstanding shares are not assets
of the corporation and are thus not part of the corpus of the insider's
trust. But the corporation's inside information is one of its assets, and
there is no apparent reason to treat it differently from other corporate
assets as far as fiduciary responsibility of insiders is concerned. Officers
and directors should be held to account to the corporation for all profits
gained from personal use of corporate inside informatiqn. One must con-
clude that the corporate title to the special knowledge within the firm and
the basic trust relation of insiders to their firm create fiduciary duties to
the corporation in this situation, not to the selling shareholders.
Two exceptions to the rule being questioned here should be notied. If
the board of directors instructs a director or officer to purchase out-
standing shares for the corporation, purchasing for himself would usurp
a corporate opportunity. The other exception is illustrated by the Brophy
43 If they [directors and officers] make a personal profit through the use of corporate
assets, they must account for it to the stockholders. It is immaterial that their deal-
ings may not have caused a loss or been harmful to the corporation; the test of liability
is whether they have unjustly gained enrichment.
Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 194, 189 Atl. 320, 324 (1937). See generally Bromschwig v.
Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66 S.W.2d 889, 892 (1933); 3 Fletcher,
Private Corporations § 898 (1947). The use by a director of corporate funds to buy stock
in another corporation was both a conversion and violation of a fiduciary duty allowing
corporate recovery of the director's profits. Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, 654 (2d Cir.
1948), modified, 169 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1948). Use of corporate assets by an officer or
director to engage in transactions for personal profit is held a material factor in declaring
a usurption of corporate opportunity in Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504,
508 (3d Cir. 1958); Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310, 318-19 (7th Cir.
1952); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 515 (1939). See generally 3
Fletcher, Private Corporations § 884, 274-75 (1947); Ballantine, Corporations 206 (rev.
ed. 1946).
44 Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 642 (1919);
Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prods. Co., 19 F.2d 24, 27 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 564
(1927); Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 187 Md. 49, 48 A.2d 322 (1946); Keely v.
Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Ad. 22 (1920); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198
Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147, 156 (1947); 3 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 900 (1947).
Corporate insiders were held not accountable for profits from speculation in shares of a
subsidiary of their corporation in Kaufman v. Wolfson, 153 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
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case.45 The board of directors secretly adopted a policy to start buying
outstanding shares in the market. The insider (confidential secretary to
a director), who had no duties relating to the corporation's purchases,
knew of the corporation's policy and that it would probably bid up the
market price of the shares. He purchased some of the corporation's out-
standing shares himself. This personal use of secret corporate informa-
tion was a breach of a confidential relation by an employee, and the com-
plaint was held to state a cause of action against the defendant for an
account to the corporation for his profits. The court specifically ruled
that no harm to the corporation need be shown. The court did not go as
far as the policy advocated here; it did not hold the insider liable merely
for using a corporate asset, corporate inside information, for personal
profit.
The rule advocated here of holding insiders liable to their corpora-
tions for personal profits from using corporate information does not
solve the related problem of speculation by corporations in their own
shares. The basic relation of corporation to shareholder is contractual. 48
The corporation is bound to represent the shareholders as a group when
dealing in the market with one shareholder. For this reason, restrictions
on purchases of their own shares by corporations cannot be foufh in the
law of trusts. They have been and must be adopted by statute the
working of the securities markets indicates is necessary." Section 10 b)
45 Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949), 63 Harv. L. Rev.
1446 (1950).
46 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 16, at 81 (1951). A corporation is not a fiduciary
toward its shareholders individually and, therefore, there is no duty on the officer buying
shares for the firm to make disclosures to the shareholder. Anchor Realty & Inv. Co. v.
Rafferty, 308 Il. App. 484, 32 N.E. 2d 394, 401 (1941).
One recent case appears to support the contrary argument, that a corporaton purchasing
its own shares is liable to the selling stockholder for the non-disclosure by its purchasing
officers of material facts they know may affect the value of the shares, which facts are
not recorded in the corporate books of account or financial statements. Northern Trust
Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Il1. App. 134, 108 N.E.2d 493 (1952). The holding
there, that the complaint stated a cause of action in equity for violation of fiduciary
duty by the defendant president for which the defendant corporation was liable, can,
however, be explained on the much more conventional fiduciary theory of the corporate-
opportunity doctrine. Defendant president of the corporation was negotiating the Oriental
theatre transaction before plaintiffs sold the corporation their shares. Defendant allegedly
failed to reveal this to the corporation's other board members, who included plaintiff's
representative and the third shareholder, Stem. He was thus alleged to have usurped a
corporate opportunity by keeping secret the Oriental theatre negotiations from the other
board members (the corporation) until he could buy out their shares and remove them
from the board. He then could (and did choose to) consummate the usurping transaction
in the corporate name, since he had become sole stockholder. Furthermore, corporate alter
ego doctrines come into play here. Allowing suit against the corporation to whom plaintiffs
sold their shares is equivalent to allowing suit against defendant president, the sole
stockholder, in circumstances where suit against him alone might fail, thereby sanctioning
constructive fraud. See Imperial Paper & Color Corp. v. Sampsell, 114 F.2d. 49, 52 (9th
Cir. 1940); 3 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 851 (1947). For requirements for applica-
tion of the alter ego doctrine, see Frank McCleary Cattle Co. v. Sewell, 73 Nev. 279, 317
P.2d 957, 959 (1957).
47 Corporations' purchases of their own stock are of course restricted by the common
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of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an example which is discussed
below, has been held to treat the duties of disclosure in purchasing shares,
whether by an individual or by a corporation.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT, SECTION 16(b)
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes profits
of insiders from short-swing purchase and resale of shares of their own
corporations recoverable by the corporations.48 This section applies only
to securities registered on a national exchange. It applies to officers,
directors and beneficial owners of more than 10 per cent of any class of
any equity security other than those exempted by the statute and the
rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The issuing corporation is given
the right to recover all profits made from short-swing speculation of six
months or less, regardless of the period the insider intended to hold the
stock at the time he bought it.
The congressional hearings indicate that section 16(b) specifically was
designed to protect "outside" stockholders against at least short-swing
speculation by insiders with advance information.49 The effect of the
statute was to make such profits inure to the benefit of the corporation. 0
The rule is based on the trust relationship of officers, directors and bene-
ficial owners of 10 per cent of a company's shares to their corporation,
that of the last of the three being enacted for the limited purpose of this
statute.5 It was designed to prevent not only the personal use of advance
corporate information by insiders but also to discourage them from per-
law and by statutes for the protection of corporate creditors and the stockholders as a
group. 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice 612-28 (1959); Rohrlich, Law & Practice
in Corporate Control 123-27 (1933). If a dominant or majority stockholder should
manipulate corporate financial policy for the purpose of corporate speculation in its own
stock, this would undoubtedly be a violation of a fiduciary duty to the minority stock-
holders. 13 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 5811 (1943).
48 For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) with-
in any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director,
or officer in entering such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. ...
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1346 (1955).
49 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943), citing Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7852
and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1934); Hearings before Committee on Currency
and Banking on S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933); and S. 56 & S. 97, 73d Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess. 6557-59 (1934). See Rubin and Feldman, "Statutory Inhibitions upon Unfair
Use of Corporate Information by Insiders," 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468 (1947).
50 Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Park &
Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
51 Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951)
Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). See Ellerin v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
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verting corporate financial policies, such as the timing of dividends,-for
their own speculative gains.2 The widespread practice of "sure thing"
speculation by corporate control groups and managers was to be ter-
minated.
(The method chosen to stop short-swing speculation in stock of listed
corporations by insiders was to make all profits from such speculation
recoverable by the corporations. Absolute prohibition of share trading
would have penalized the manager who had enough confidence in his
ability to make good faith investments in stock of his own corporation.
It would also have impaired the use of stock option plans as a form of
compensation. Allowing recovery only where there was proof of misuse
of confidential information was considered to put too great burdens of
proof on the issuer corporation in a situation where evidence was mostly
circumstantial and difficult to assemble.53 The compromise was to make
all short-swing profits recoverable by the issuer corporation without the
necessity of proving bad faith on the part of the insider. 4 Recovery by
the corporation is thus not dependent on proof of actual or unfair use of
information, but only that the profit was made by the insider.5 In the
unusual case, when someone else manages his investments, the insider can
find himself liable to his corporation for short-swing profits even though
he was unaware that he had bought or sold shares in his corporation.56
A chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission has-pointed
out unofficially that section 16(b) "appears to proceed on the principle
that the confidential information which a corporate insider automatically
obtains by virtue of his position belongs to the corporation. ' 57 As to lisied
securities, the statute was designed to plug the hole in fiduciary law dis-
cussed in the previous section, which allowed the insider to make per-
sonal profits from using corporate information. One court has thus held
52 S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). For descriptions of other abuses by
insiders, see S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 47, 55-68 (1934). See also H.R. Rep.
Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Loss, Securities Regulation 883-84 (1951).
53 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
54 Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 820 (1953); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), cause remanded on other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
(1956); Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Co. v. Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423, 427 (M.D. Pa. 1954);
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W. R. Stephens Iny. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 845 (W.D. Ark.
1956); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See generally
Yourd, "Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act," 38 Mich. L. Rev. 133, 139-52 (1939).
55 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282, 284 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Trun-
cale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
56 Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952). In this case the director was a
member of a partnership that engaged in stock speculation but did not personally take
part in the decision to speculate in the stock of his corporation.
57 Cook and Feldman, "Insider Trading under the Securities Exchange Act," 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 385, 408 (1953).
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that section 16(b) is not penal, but is remedial in that its purpose is to
deter "what was reasonably thought to be a widespread abuse of a
fiduciary relationship." '58
Section 16(b) takes the position that the fiduciary duty of the insider
when dealing in shares of his corporation is owed to the corporation and
not to the "outside" shareholders with whom he deals. This is in contrast
to the expanding minority group of states where common law requires
fiduciary disclosures by the insider, not to his corporation but to the
shareholders from whom he purchases shares. As stated in the preceding,
section, the writer believes that the fiduciary responsibility in this i:ype
of transaction is solely to the corporation. The logic of section 16(b) is
thus the same as that of all other fiduciary law. It is derived from cor-
porate title to its own confidential information and the basic trust rela-
tion of officers and directors to their corporations.
It should be noted that there is a possibility of double liability for the
officer or director of a listed corporation who makes a private purchase
of outstanding shares in his firm. If he resells them within six months,
there may be corporate recovery of his profits under section 16(b). There
may also be recovery by the selling shareholder for failure of the insider
to make full disclosure to him under the common law in a minority-rule
or special-circumstances rule state or under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which is discussed in the next section. The argu-
ments submitted here would support corporate recovery under section
16(b) or under the general corporate fiduciary duty of insiders. Absent
active fraud by the purchasing insider, another recovery by the selling
shareholder should be denied. But if there is active fraud by the pur-
chasing insider, a strong argument in favor of double recovery can be
made on the basis that the single purchase involved wrongs against both
the corporation and the selling shareholder.59
Section 16(b) is more strict than common law fiduciary duties in that
it creates liability to the corporations for profits even though the insider
acted in good faith. The statute is, however, less pervasive than common
law duties. The mechanistic six month limitation means that section
16(b) fails to cover the situation where the insider in bad faith does use
confidential information in deciding to purchase shares in his corporation
but sells no shares in the corporation for more than six months there-
58 Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959). Only one court has said that the
statute was only punitive because speculation by an insider causes no damage to the
remaining stock. Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955) (dictum).
59 For arguments supporting double recovery, see Comment, 59 Yale L.j. 1120, 1140-
42 (1950). Compare Stevens, Corporations 701-02 (2d ed. 1949).
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after.60 For this reason, section 16(b) is not a substitute for a common
law fiduciary duty to the corporation when an insider uses corporate in-
formation for his own profit. The recommendation of the preceding sec-
tion that the general fiduciary duty of officers and directors to their cor-
porations should apply to stock transactions is timely even though section
16(b) covers some of this area for listed securities.
Another limitation of section 16(b) is that it covers only listed secu-
rities and not all security transactions where there is federal jurisdiction.
It does not apply to unlisted securities which are traded over-the-counter
in interstate commerce. 61 It can not apply to securities in closed corpora-
tions wlhere interstate commerce is not concerned. The language of the
act further limits liability solely to the officers, directors, and beneficial
owners there designated. It makes the insider liable only for profits
realized by him, not for those earned by his friends with whom he shared
his inside corporate information.62 The -rigid objective standards of this
statute may enable insiders to make gifts of inside information to out-
siders and under the statute not become liable to the corporation for the
profits made by donees of the information.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT, SECTION 10(b)
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has been inter-
preted to take the other approach to the problem of the purchase of out-
standing shares by corporate insiders.63 Instead of duty to the corpora-
tion and recovery by the corporation as in section 16(b), section 10(b)
60 Since all shares are alike, matching of certificates is not required for liability under
§ 16(b). Hence, a purchase of shares by an insider who already owns some shares must
be followed by no sales from either group of shares for six months in order to avoid liability
to the corporation for profits. Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433, 434
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953). A director who purchased shares in the
corporation before he became an officer but sold them after assuming his post, the pur-
chase and sale being within a six-month period, was held liable to his corporation for
the profits earned. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
61 For a summary of proposals to expand the classes of securities covered by § 16(b),
see Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Report on Unlisted Securities, S. Rep.
No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Hear-
ings on SEC Legislation, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, Stock Market Study, S. Rep. No. 376, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). See Re-
port of SEC on S. 2054 to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Comm. Print 1956).
62 Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952), 25 So. Cal. L. Rev. 475.
63 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility or any
national securities exchange-
(a) ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security reg-
istered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1958).
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and SEC rule X-10B-56 prohibit fraudulent schemes against selling
shareholders. Although this section does not provide a civil remedy, the
courts have consistently held that one is implied. 5 Many more classes
of transactions are covered by section 10(b) than section 16(b), which
latter section applies only to equity securities listed on a national ex-
change. The language of section 10(b) indicates that it applies to any
security and that it is not limited to transactions on a national securities
exchange or even to over-the-counter markets where interstate commerce
is involved. This section also applies to any securities transaction which
has been carried on "by the use of any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce or the mails." It has been interpreted liberally so that
the fraudulent misrepresentation or deceptive device need not have been
carried by the mails; jurisdiction is found if there was any use of the
mails in connection with the purchase or sale.66
What is the scope of the remedy in the selling stockholder under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule X-10B-5 for false or deceptive practices by a pur-
chasing insider? The history of rule X-10B-5 has been summarized by
Judge A. Hand. 67 He points out that the rule is almost a verbatim adop-
tion of the language in section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,"8
which prohibits fraud in the sale of securities, such as by the holder of
outstanding shares who is about to sell them. Rule X-10B-5 was adopted
to close this "... loophole in the protections against fraud administered
64 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1949).
For an excellent analysis of the scope of this rule, see Comment, 59 Yale LJ. 1120 (1950).
65 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 762 (D.N.J.
1955). See generally Comment, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1133 (1950); Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev.
858 (1948); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 649 (1954).
For an excellent survey of this problem under the 1933 Securities Act, see Shulman, "Civil
Liability and the Securities Act," 43 Yale L.J. 227 (1933).
66 Errion v. Connell, 236 F2d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d
627, 634 (9th Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp.
954, 964 (N.D. II1. 1952).
67 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952). Promulgation of rule X-10B-5 was held not to be an invalid usurpation of
legislative power by the SEC in United States v. Shindler, 173 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. N.Y.
1959).
68 48 Stat. 84 § 17(a) (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958). See Latty, "The Aggrieved
Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes,"
18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 505, 508 (1953).
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by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying
securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." 9
It is clear from the cases that common law fraud in the purchase
of securities by a corporate insider violates section 10(b) and rule X-
1OB-5.7 ° In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 7 1 the purchasing insider
knowingly misrepresented that he had made no agreement for the sale of
the corporation's assets. A complaint alleging fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions by a control group was held to state a cause of action under sec-
tion 10(b) in Robinson v. Difford,72 and in the related case of Fratt v.
Robinson.73 It is notable that in interpreting section 10(b) as a basis
of remedy for common law fraud in security transactions, the common
law requirement that the plaintiff purchaser or seller be one that defend-
ant intended to defraud has been retained.71
A party who has been a victim of common law fraud in a securities
transaction has two main advantages in suing under section 10(b) in-
stead of suing under common law in the state courts. He has the benefit
of extraterritorial service of process, and he is relieved of some of the
narrow, technical limitations of the fraud concept under common law.75
The case of Errion v. Connell,"6 though not concerned with purchase by
a corporate insider, is clearly illustrative of the utility of section 10(b).
The fraud was committed in the State of Washington, after which the
seven defendants retired to Oregon. They left in Washington only a cor-
poration, which would also be a necessary defendant. It was unwise for
69 SEC Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942. This release announced the adoption of rule
X-10B-5.
70 There is only one recorded opinion in which a district court dismissed an action by
holding that rule X-10B-5 does not cover common-law fraud. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp.
786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954). On appeal, the dismissal was upheld on other grounds, the court
of appeals noting that it did not concur with the district court's opinion on the limited
scope of rue X-10B-5. Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955). See Notes, 68 Harv.
L. Rev. 1290 (1955) ; 54 Mich. L. Rev. 149 (1955) ; 103 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1098 (1955).
71 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), supplemented, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
72 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950), 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1018 (1951). See similar ruling
in Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D.Ill. 1952).
73 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
74 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952), 4 Stanford L. Rev. 308. In this case, plaintiffs
purchased shares on a national exchange subsequent to the issuance of an allegedly false
financial statement by defendant directors, who had sold their shares on the exchange.
The district court dismissed the complaint because there was not "a semblance of privity
between the vendor and purchaser." See Loss, Securities Regulation 1064 (1951) & (Supp.
1955, at 371-72). See also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
75 For comparisons of common-law and SEC fraud concepts, see Loss, Securities Regula-
tion 812-23 (1951), and Latty, op. cit. supra note 68, at 525-34. For a summary of pro-
cedural advantages of a § 10(b) action, see Comment, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1130-33 (1950).
See judge Clark's comments on the expanded fraud concept in the SEC Act in a case
holding a broker liable for non-disclosure of his large profits from selling shares to a cus-
tomer. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944).
76 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956), 9 Stanford L. Rev. 589 (1957).
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plaintiff to sue in Oregon because its two-year statute of limitations had
probably run. She could not sue in the Federal Court in Washington on
the basis of diversity of citizenship because the Washington corporation
had to be made a defendant. Only section 10(b) and rule X-10B-5 gave
jurisdictional basis for suit. The alleged misrepresentations in the case
were all on the borderline between fact and predictive opinion. They
were that certain land would be condemned by a municipality and that
its reasonable worth was $1,200 per acre. Nevertheless, under the com-
prehensive language of rule X-10B-5, the court was able to find a
fraudulent scheme. Decision for plaintiff was affirmed.
Assuming that an insider when purchasing outstanding shares does
not commit active fraud, can he be held liable under section 10(b) and
rule X-10B-5 for mere failure to disclose facts he knows about the cor-
poration that are unavailable to outside stockholders?77 It is fairly clear
that the commission does consider rule X-10B-5 to put affirmative duties
of disclosure on purchasing insiders, that under this rule the insiders are
to be held liable as fiduciaries toward the stockholders from whom they
buy shares. The commission view was stated in the Ward La France in-
vestigation. 78 The president and the treasurer of the company, who owned
74 per cent of its outstanding shares, had almost completed negotiations
to sell their shares for about $45 each. They ordered a broker to buy
other outstanding shares for the corporation in the open market, which
he did at prices from $3.25 to $5.75 per share. Selling shareholders were
not told that Ward La France was the purchaser, that the two officers
were about to sell their controlling shares for about $45, that the amount
to be paid on liquidation was about $25 per share, and that earnings since
the last published report had risen from $2.73 per year to $15.75 for the
more recent 11 months. The commission concluded that this failure to
disclose material facts violated rule X-10B-5. No formal action was
taken as voluntary restitution was made to the minority shareholders.
This same view, that rule X-10B-5 requires affirmative disclosures, was
taken by the commission in over ten injunction actions, all of which re-
sulted in consent decrees or dismissals following voluntary restitution. 79
There have been few court opinions on whether section 10(b) and
rule X-10B-5 create liability for mere non-disclosure of special facts to
the shareholder from whom the insider purchases share6. It can be
argued that earlier federal cases applying the common law to stock pur-
77 See Loss, Securities Regulation 828-38 (1951); Comment, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1142-49
(1950).
78 Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
79 These cases are discussed in Loss, Securities Regulation 827 (1951); Comment, 59
Yale L.J. 1120, 1145-46 (1950) ; Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 772 (1946).
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chases by insiders would control the interpretation of the language in
section 10(b). In such case, the special circumstances rule as applied in
Strong v, Repide80 would require affirmative disclosures to selling stock-
holders. There is a dictum in the Kardon case to this effect.81
The case in which the problem has received the most torough dis-
cussion is Speed v. Transamerica Corp.8 2 This case concerned the pur-
chase of outstanding shares of Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company, not by
an officer or director, but by a controlling shareholder, Transamerica
Corporation. Plaintiffs sold their Class A and Class B shares at $40 and
'\$12 per share respectively, when they were allegedly worth $200 and
$ 00 per share respectively. There is a question whether this was a mere
non-disclosure case or one containing common law fraud. The trial court
first dismissed a count for common law fraud and then reinstated it.
It fftrther held that the parent, Transamerica, by reason of its con-
trol over the board of directors of the subsidiary, Axton-Fisher, was
under a fiduciary obligation to the minority shareholders of Axton-
Fisher.83
The plaintiffs alleged a fraudulent act in the Speed case in that Trans-
america had caused a 1941 Annual Report of Axton-Fisher to be dis-
tributed to Axton-Fisher shareholders, showing the average inventory
cost of Axton-Fisher to be $7.5 million while it had a real value of $17
million. There was a finding that this statement was released at a time
when the defendant had a secret, undisclosed intent to liquidate Axton-
Fisher and realize the profit on the tobacco invent6ry. For this reason,
the statements made were found to be misleading. Such misleading state-
ments, half-truths, were found to be a case of fraud and deceit at com-
mon law and under subparagraph (b) of rule X-10B-5 which makes it
illegal "to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.84
The court went on, however, to point out that the mere non-disclosure
of the intent to liquidate Axton-Fisher to capture the inventory ap-
preciation violated subparagraphs (a) and (c) of rule X-10B-5. The
non-disclosures were considered a scheme to defraud. It is clear from
Judge Leahy's statements that he considers rule X-10B-5 to create af-
80 Supra note 23.
81 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
82 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), supplemented, 100 F. Supp. 461, rehearing denied at
463 (D. Del. 1951), motiond-nied, 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952). For opinion on motion
for summary judgment, see 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947). For opinion on damages,
see 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified and affirmed, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
83 99 F. Supp. 808, 849.
84 Id. at 828, 829.
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firmative duties of disclosure on corporate insiders when purchasing
shares.85
Further authority that rule X-10B-5 puts a fiduciary duty of dis-
closure on corporate insiders purchasing outstanding shares is found in
the recent case of Reed v. Riddle Airlines.86 Riddle, the president of the
corporation, purchased stock from Reed, a minority shareholder, and
allegedly induced the sale by the fraudulent misrepresentation that there
was no market for the stock. The trial court found for defendant, holding
that the misrepresentation had not occurred and that Reed had learned
prior to his selling that a third party, Davis, was interested in purchasing
control of the firm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but held that Riddle
was excused from his affirmative duty to disclose to Reed that Davis was
interested in purchasing it only because Reed was found to have known
this fact already. The appeals court thus held that the insider had a
fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts he knew about the value of
the stock. It held that rule X-10B-5 incoiporates this duty, which the
same court had previously held to be the law of Louisiana in the Mans-
field case."7
Unquestionably, the law relating to the duties of disclosure on cor-
porate insiders when purchasing outstanding shares has long been and
still is in an unsettled state. The majority of state courts continue to
hold that the corporate insider has no fiduciary duties of disclosure to
individual shareholders from whom he purchases shares. A growing
minority of state courts, however, hold that, because of his superior ac-
cess to information, the corporate insider does have a fiduciary duty here
to make affirmative disclosures to -the selling shareholder. Although most
of these cases have involved active fraud by corporate insiders, the courts
have chosen to rest their decisions primarily on an equitable duty of dis-
85 It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the stock
of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affecting the value of the
stock, known to the majority stockholders by virtue of their inside position but not
known to the selling minority stockholders, which information would have affected
the judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of pre-
venting a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the
uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to provide some degree of equaliza-
tion of bargaining position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judg-
ment in any such transaction. Some courts have called this a fiduciary duty while
others state it is a duty imposed by the "special circumstances". One of the primary
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et. seq., was to out-
law the use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for
their own financial advantage to the detriment of uninformed public security holders.
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29.
86 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959).
87 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1959). See
page 61, supra, for a discussion of this case.
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closure that puts the main burden of persuasion on the corporate insider.
The SEC and some federal courts have interpreted the anti-fraud pro-
visions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC rule
X-10B-5 to create a federal cause of action in selling shareholders against
corporate insiders who purchase their shaes without disclosing special
facts they have learned by virtue of their inside position. One must con-
clude that both state and federal courts have established a trend toward
extending the fiduciary duties of disclosure on corporate insiders to
individual stockholders from whom they buy shares.
The aspect of fiduciary law that seems most logically applicable in this
situation is the one that has been most neglected in the cases. The argu-
ment is that since the insider uses a corporate asset, corporate inside
information, to speculate for his personal profit, he violates his fiduciary
duty to the corporation. Nevertheless, the few courts that have dealt
with the problem have denied corporate recovery, reasoning that specula-
tion in its own stock is not a corporate function. It is submitted that this
reasoning obscures the real issue. An agent's use of his principal's assets
for his own personal gain ipso facto creates unjust enrichment and con-
stitutes a violation of fiduciary responsibility. One can only conclude
that the courts have erred in denying corporate recovery of profits made
by officers and directors by speculating in the stock of their corporation
without consent of the board of directors.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which allows corporate
recovery of an insider's profits, is based on a theory that corporate inside
information is corporate property and that it is subject to the traditional
fiduciary duty. Its limited application to stock traded on a national ex-
change and held for less than six months makes section 16(b) no substi-
tute for a general fiduciary duty to the corporation in this area.
The related problems of purchases of outstanding shares by corpora-
tions themselves or by insiders with consent of their corporations cannot
be satisfactorily treated under established fiduciary law. To the extent
that an exceptional opportunity for security manipulation exists in such
transactions, they should be controlled by state and federal statutes
aimed at the specific wrongs. It is submitted that the purchase of shares
by corporations or insiders usually does not involve the placing of trust
by the selling shareholder. For this reason, extensions of equitable
fiduciary doctrines or expanded application of federal anti-fraud statutes
are not appropriate remedies.
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